A flaw in Microsoft Entra ID’s legacy login allowed attackers to bypass MFA, concentrating on admin accounts throughout finance, healthcare, and tech sectors.
Cybersecurity agency Guardz has found a focused marketing campaign exploiting a weak spot in Microsoft Entra ID’s legacy authentication protocols, permitting attackers to bypass fashionable safety measures like Multi-Issue Authentication (MFA).
The assaults, which occurred between March 18 and April 7, 2025, utilized Primary Authentication Model 2 – Useful resource Proprietor Password Credential (BAV2ROPC), a legacy login methodology, to achieve unauthorized entry, highlighting the hazards of outdated authentication in cloud environments.
This marketing campaign, in accordance with Guardz’s report, shared with Hackread.com, focused varied sectors together with monetary companies, healthcare, manufacturing, and know-how companies.
This incident follows the widespread Microsoft Entra ID account lockouts reported by Hackread.com in April 2025, attributable to an inner Microsoft error with refresh tokens and the MACE Credential Revocation app. Whereas Hackread’s report detailed unintentional lockouts resulting from an inner challenge, the Guardz discovery highlights a deliberate exploitation of Entra ID vulnerabilities by malicious actors.
Marketing campaign Evaluation
Guardz Analysis Unit (GRU) found that menace actors had been actively exploiting BAV2ROPC – a compatibility function inside Entra ID that permits older purposes to authenticate utilizing easy usernames and passwords.
In contrast to up to date interactive login processes that mandate MFA and different safety checks, BAV2ROPC operates non-interactively. This vital distinction permits attackers to utterly circumvent MFA, Conditional Entry Insurance policies, and even login alerts and person presence verification, successfully rendering these fashionable protections ineffective.
Assault Timeline
The assault occured in two distinct phases beginning with an “Initialization” section between March 18th and twentieth, characterised by a decrease depth of probing, averaging round 2,709 suspicious login makes an attempt every day.
This was adopted by a “Sustained Assault” section, from March twenty first to April third, which featured a dramatic surge in exercise, spiking to over 6,444 makes an attempt per day (a whopping 138% enhance). This escalation indicated a transparent shift in the direction of aggressive exploitation of the recognized vulnerabilities.
Guardz Analysis tracked over 9,000 suspicious Trade login makes an attempt, primarily from Japanese Europe and the Asia-Pacific area. The marketing campaign concerned automated credential spraying and brute-force techniques, specializing in uncovered legacy endpoints.
The assaults focused varied legacy authentication vectors, with over 90% geared toward Trade On-line and the Microsoft Authentication Library, together with a big concentrate on administrator accounts.
“Admin accounts had been a particular focus. One subset acquired practically 10,000 makes an attempt from 432 IPs inside 8 hours,“ wrote Guardz’s Elli Shlomo of their weblog publish.
Whereas the marketing campaign has subsided, Guardz warns that the vulnerability persists in lots of organizations nonetheless counting on protocols like BAV2ROPC, SMTP AUTH, POP3, and IMAP4 for compatibility. These strategies bypass MFA, ignore Conditional Entry, and allow silent, non-interactive logins, thus, making a “hidden backdoor,” researchers famous.
Dor Eisner, CEO and Co-Founding father of Guardz emphasised the vital nature of this challenge, stating, “This marketing campaign is a wake-up name, not nearly one vulnerability, however in regards to the broader have to retire outdated applied sciences that not serve at present’s menace panorama.”
To mitigate the dangers, Guardz urges organizations to instantly audit and disable legacy authentication, implement fashionable authentication with MFA, implement conditional entry insurance policies to dam unsupported flows, and intently monitor for uncommon login exercise.