In August 2024, ESET researchers detected cyberespionage exercise carried out by the China-aligned MirrorFace superior persistent risk (APT) group towards a Central European diplomatic institute in relation to Expo 2025, which shall be held in Osaka, Japan.
Recognized primarily for its cyberespionage actions towards organizations in Japan, to the perfect of our information, that is the primary time MirrorFace supposed to infiltrate a European entity. The marketing campaign, which we uncovered in Q2 and Q3 of 2024 and named Operation AkaiRyū (Japanese for RedDragon), showcases refreshed techniques, methods, and procedures (TTPs) that we noticed all through 2024: the introduction of recent instruments (equivalent to a personalized AsyncRAT), the resurrection of ANEL, and a fancy execution chain.
On this blogpost, we current particulars of the Operation AkaiRyū assaults and findings from our investigation of the diplomatic institute case, together with information from our forensic evaluation. ESET Analysis offered the outcomes of this evaluation on the Joint Safety Analyst Convention (JSAC) in January 2025.
Key factors of this blogpost:
- MirrorFace has refreshed its TTPs and tooling.
- MirrorFace has began utilizing ANEL, a backdoor beforehand related completely with APT10.
- MirrorFace has began deploying a closely personalized variant of AsyncRAT, utilizing a fancy execution chain to run it inside Home windows Sandbox.
- To our information, MirrorFace focused a European entity for the primary time.
- We collaborated with the affected Central European diplomatic institute and carried out a forensic investigation.
- The findings obtained throughout that investigation have supplied us with higher perception into MirrorFace’s post-compromise actions.
MirrorFace profile
MirrorFace, also called Earth Kasha, is a China-aligned risk actor till now nearly completely concentrating on firms and organizations in Japan but additionally some positioned elsewhere which have relationships with Japan. As defined on this blogpost, we now take into account MirrorFace to be a subgroup beneath the APT10 umbrella. MirrorFace has been lively since not less than 2019 and has been reported to focus on media, defense-related firms, suppose tanks, diplomatic organizations, monetary establishments, tutorial establishments, and producers. In 2022, we found a MirrorFace spearphishing marketing campaign concentrating on Japanese political entities.
MirrorFace focuses on espionage and exfiltration of information of curiosity; it’s the solely group recognized to make use of the LODEINFO and HiddenFace backdoors. Within the 2024 actions analyzed on this blogpost, MirrorFace began utilizing APT10’s former signature backdoor, ANEL, in its operations as nicely.
Overview
Very similar to earlier MirrorFace assaults, Operation AkaiRyū started with fastidiously crafted spearphishing emails designed to entice recipients to open malicious attachments. Our findings counsel that regardless of this group’s foray past the borders of its ordinary looking floor, the risk actor nonetheless maintains a robust deal with Japan and occasions tied to the nation. Nonetheless, this isn’t the primary time MirrorFace has been reported to function outdoors of Japan: Development Micro and the Vietnamese Nationwide Cyber Safety Middle (doc in Vietnamese) reported on such circumstances in Taiwan, India, and Vietnam.
ANEL’s comeback
Throughout our evaluation of Operation AkaiRyū, we found that MirrorFace has considerably refreshed its TTPs and tooling. MirrorFace began utilizing ANEL (additionally known as UPPERCUT) – a backdoor thought of unique to APT10 – which is stunning, because it was believed that ANEL was deserted across the finish of 2018 or the beginning of 2019 and that LODEINFO succeeded it, showing later in 2019. The small distinction in model numbers between 2018 and 2024 ANELs, 5.5.0 and 5.5.4, and the truth that APT10 used to replace ANEL each few months, strongly counsel that the event of ANEL has restarted.
Using ANEL additionally offers additional proof within the ongoing debate in regards to the potential connection between MirrorFace and APT10. The truth that MirrorFace has began utilizing ANEL, and the opposite beforehand recognized info, equivalent to related concentrating on and malware code similarities, led us to make a change in our attribution: we now consider that MirrorFace is a subgroup beneath the APT10 umbrella. This attribution change aligns our considering with different researchers who already take into account MirrorFace to be part of APT10, equivalent to these at Macnica (report in Japanese), Kaspersky, ITOCHU Cyber & Intelligence Inc., and Cybereason. Others, as at Development Micro, as of now nonetheless take into account MirrorFace to be solely probably associated to APT10.
First use of AsyncRAT and Visible Studio Code by MirrorFace
In 2024, MirrorFace additionally deployed a closely personalized variant of AsyncRAT, embedding this malware right into a newly noticed, intricate execution chain that runs the RAT inside Home windows Sandbox. This technique successfully obscures the malicious actions from safety controls and hamstrings efforts to detect the compromise.
In parallel to the malware, MirrorFace additionally began deploying Visible Studio Code (VS Code) to abuse its distant tunnels characteristic. Distant tunnels allow MirrorFace to determine stealthy entry to the compromised machine, execute arbitrary code, and ship different instruments. MirrorFace shouldn’t be the one APT group abusing VS Code: Tropic Trooper and Mustang Panda have additionally been reported utilizing it of their assaults.
Moreover, MirrorFace continued to make use of its present flagship backdoor, HiddenFace, additional bolstering persistence on compromised machines. Whereas ANEL is utilized by MirrorFace because the first-line backdoor, proper after the goal has been compromised, HiddenFace is deployed within the later levels of the assault. It’s also value noting that in 2024 we didn’t observe any use of LODEINFO, one other backdoor used completely by MirrorFace.
Forensic evaluation of the compromise
We contacted the affected institute to tell them in regards to the assault and to wash up the compromise as quickly as attainable. The institute collaborated carefully with us throughout and after the assault, and moreover supplied us with the disk pictures from the compromised machines. This enabled us to carry out forensic analyses on these pictures and uncover additional MirrorFace exercise.
ESET Analysis supplied extra technical particulars about ANEL’s return to ESET Menace Intelligence clients on September 4th, 2024. Development Micro printed their findings on then-recent MirrorFace actions on October 21st, 2024 in Japanese and on November 26th, 2024 in English: these overlap with Operation AkaiRyū and in addition point out the return of the ANEL backdoor. Moreover, in January 2025, the Japanese Nationwide Police Company (NPA) printed a warning about MirrorFace actions to organizations, companies, and people in Japan. Operation AkaiRyū corresponds with Marketing campaign C, as talked about within the Japanese model of NPA’s warning. Nonetheless, NPA mentions the concentrating on of Japanese entities completely – people and organizations primarily associated to academia, suppose tanks, politics, and the media.
Along with Development Micro’s report and NPA’s warning, we offer an unique evaluation of MirrorFace post-compromise actions, which we had been in a position to observe because of the shut cooperation of the affected group. This contains the deployment of a closely personalized AsyncRAT, abuse of VS Code distant tunnels, and particulars on the execution chain that runs malware inside Home windows Sandbox to keep away from detection and conceal the carried out actions.
On this blogpost, we cowl two distinct circumstances: a Central European diplomatic institute and a Japanese analysis institute. Despite the fact that MirrorFace’s general method is similar in each circumstances, there are notable variations within the preliminary entry course of; therefore we describe them each.
Technical evaluation
Between June and September 2024, we noticed MirrorFace conducting a number of spearphishing campaigns. Based mostly on our information, the attackers primarily gained preliminary entry by tricking targets into opening malicious attachments or hyperlinks, then they leveraged professional functions and instruments to stealthily set up their malware.
Preliminary entry
We weren’t in a position to decide the preliminary assault vector for all of the circumstances noticed in 2024. Nonetheless, based mostly on the info out there to us, we assume that spearphishing was the one assault vector utilized by MirrorFace. The group impersonates trusted organizations or people to persuade recipients to open paperwork or click on hyperlinks. The next findings on preliminary entry align with these within the Development Micro article, though they don’t seem to be fully the identical.
Particularly, in Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace abused each McAfee-developed functions and in addition one developed by JustSystems to run ANEL. Whereas Development Micro reported Home windows Administration Instrumentation (WMI) and explorer.exe because the execution proxy pair for ANEL, we unearthed one other pair: WMI and wlrmdr.exe (Home windows logon reminder). We additionally present an e-mail dialog between a disguised MirrorFace operator and a goal.
Case 1: Japanese analysis institute
On June 20th, 2024, MirrorFace focused two workers of a Japanese analysis institute, utilizing a malicious, password-protected Phrase doc delivered in an unknown method.
The paperwork triggered VBA code on a easy mouseover occasion – the malicious code was triggered by transferring the mouse over textual content containers positioned within the doc. It then abused a signed McAfee executable to load ANEL (model 5.5.4) into reminiscence. The compromise chain is depicted in Determine 1.
Case 2: Central European diplomatic institute
On August 26th, 2024, MirrorFace focused a Central European diplomatic institute. To our information, that is the primary, and, up to now, solely time MirrorFace has focused an entity in Europe.
MirrorFace operators arrange their spearphishing assault by crafting an e-mail message (proven in Determine 2) that references a earlier, professional interplay between the institute and a Japanese NGO. The professional interplay was in all probability obtained from a earlier marketing campaign. As will be seen, this spearphishing arrange message refers back to the upcoming Expo 2025 exhibition, an occasion that shall be held in Japan.
This primary e-mail was innocent, however as soon as the goal responded, MirrorFace operators despatched an e-mail message with a malicious OneDrive hyperlink resulting in a ZIP archive with a LNK file disguised as a Phrase doc named The EXPO Exhibition in Japan in 2025.docx.lnk. This second message is proven in Determine 3. Utilizing this method, MirrorFace hid the payload till the goal was engaged within the spearphishing scheme.
As soon as opened, the LNK file launches a fancy compromise chain, depicted in Determine 4 and Determine 5.
The LNK file runs cmd.exe with a set of PowerShell instructions to drop further information, together with a malicious Phrase file, tmp.docx, which masses a malicious Phrase template, normal_.dotm, containing VBA code. The contents of the Phrase doc tmp.docx are depicted in Determine 6, and possibly are supposed to behave as a decoy, whereas malicious actions are operating within the background.
The VBA code extracts a legitimately signed software from JustSystems Company to side-load and decrypt the ANEL backdoor (model 5.5.5). This gave MirrorFace a foothold to start post-compromise operations.
Toolset
In Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace relied not solely on its customized malware, but additionally on varied instruments and a personalized variant of a publicly out there distant entry trojan (RAT).
ANEL
ANEL (also called UPPERCUT) is a backdoor that was beforehand related completely with APT10. In 2024, MirrorFace began utilizing ANEL as its first-line backdoor. ANEL’s growth, till 2018, was described most not too long ago in Secureworks’ JSAC 2019 presentation. The ANEL variants noticed in 2024 had been publicly described by Development Micro.
ANEL is a backdoor, solely discovered on disk in an encrypted type, and whose decrypted DLL type is barely ever present in reminiscence as soon as a loader has decrypted it in preparation for execution. ANEL communicates with its C&C server over HTTP, the place the transmitted information is encrypted to guard it in case the communication is being captured. ANEL helps primary instructions for file manipulation, payload execution, and taking a screenshot.
ANELLDR
ANELLDR is a loader completely used to decrypt the ANEL backdoor and run it in reminiscence. Development Micro described ANELLDR of their article.
HiddenFace
HiddenFace is MirrorFace’s present flagship backdoor, with a heavy deal with modularity; we described it intimately on this JSAC 2024 presentation.
FaceXInjector
FaceXInjector is a C# injection device saved in an XML file, compiled and executed by the Microsoft MSBuild utility, and used to completely execute HiddenFace. We described FaceXInjector in the identical JSAC 2024 presentation devoted to HiddenFace.
AsyncRAT
AsyncRAT is a RAT publicly out there on GitHub. In 2024, we detected that MirrorFace began utilizing a closely personalized AsyncRAT within the later levels of its assaults. The group ensures AsyncRAT’s persistence by registering a scheduled activity that executes at machine startup; as soon as triggered, a fancy chain (depicted in Determine 7) launches AsyncRAT inside Home windows Sandbox, which should be manually enabled and requires a reboot. We had been unable to find out how MirrorFace allows this characteristic.
The next information are delivered to the compromised machine with a purpose to efficiently execute AsyncRAT:
- 7z.exe – professional 7-Zip executable.
- 7z.dll – professional 7-Zip library.
.7z – password-protected 7z archive containing AsyncRAT, named setup.exe..bat – batch script that unpacks AsyncRAT and runs it..wsb – Home windows Sandbox configuration file to run.bat .
The triggered scheduled activity executes Home windows Sandbox with
Particularly, the config file defines whether or not to allow networking and listing mapping, the devoted reminiscence dimension, and the command to execute on launch. Within the file proven in Determine 8, a batch file positioned within the sandbox folder is executed. The batch file extracts AsyncRAT from the 7z archive, then creates and launches a scheduled activity that executes AsyncRAT each hour.
The AsyncRAT variant utilized by MirrorFace is closely personalized. The next are the primary options and modifications launched by MirrorFace:
- Pattern tagging – AsyncRAT will be compiled for a particular sufferer and MirrorFace can add a tag to the configuration to mark the pattern. If the tag shouldn’t be specified, the machine’s NetBIOS identify is used because the tag. This tag is additional utilized in different launched options as nicely.
- Connection to a C&C server by way of Tor – MirrorFace’s AsyncRAT can obtain and begin a Tor consumer, and proxy its communication with a C&C server by the consumer. AsyncRAT selects this feature provided that the hardcoded C&C domains finish with .onion. This method was chosen in each samples we noticed throughout the investigation of Case 2: Central European diplomatic institute.
- Area era algorithm (DGA) – An alternative choice to utilizing Tor, this variant can use a DGA to generate a C&C area. The DGA may also generate machine-specific domains utilizing the aforementioned tag. Observe that HiddenFace additionally makes use of a DGA with the potential of producing machine-specific domains, though the DGA utilized in HiddenFace differs from the AsyncRAT one.
- Working time – Earlier than connecting to a C&C server, AsyncRAT checks whether or not the present hour and day of the week are inside working hours and days outlined within the configuration. Observe that MirrorFace’s AsyncRAT shares this characteristic with HiddenFace as nicely.
Visible Studio Code distant tunnels
Visible Studio Code is a free source-code editor developed by Microsoft. Visible Studio Code’s distant growth characteristic, distant tunnels, permits builders to run Visible Studio Code domestically and connect with a growth machine that hosts the supply code and debugging surroundings. Menace actors can misuse this to achieve distant entry, execute code, and ship instruments to a compromised machine. MirrorFace has been doing so since 2024; nonetheless, it isn’t the one APT group that has used such distant tunnels: different China-aligned APT teams equivalent to Tropic Trooper and Mustang Panda have additionally used them of their assaults.
Put up-compromise actions
Our investigation into Case 2: Central European diplomatic institute uncovered a few of MirrorFace’s post-compromise actions. By means of shut collaboration with the institute, we gained higher perception into the malware and instruments deployed by MirrorFace, as seen in Desk 1.
Observe that the malware and instruments are ordered within the desk for simpler comparability of what was deployed on every of the 2 recognized compromised machines however doesn’t mirror how they had been deployed chronologically.
Desk 1. Malware and instruments deployed by MirrorFace all through the assault
| Instruments | Notes | Machine A | Machine B |
| ANEL | APT10’s backdoor that MirrorFace makes use of as a first-line backdoor. |
● |
● |
| PuTTY | An open-source terminal emulator, serial console, and community file switch software. | ● | ● |
| VS Code | A code editor developed by Microsoft. | ● | ● |
| HiddenFace | MirrorFace’s flagship backdoor. | ● | ● |
| Second HiddenFace variant | MirrorFace’s flagship backdoor. | ● | |
| AsyncRAT | RAT publicly out there on GitHub. | ● | ● |
| Hidden Begin | A device that can be utilized to bypass UAC, disguise Home windows consoles, and run packages within the background. | ● | |
| csvde | Professional Microsoft device out there on Home windows servers that imports and exports information from Energetic Listing Area Providers (AD DS). | ● | |
| Rubeus | Toolset for Kerberos interplay and abuse, publicly out there on GitHub. | ● | |
| frp | Quick reverse proxy publicly out there on GitHub. | ● | |
| Unknown device | Disguised beneath the identify oneuu.exe. We had been unable to get better the device throughout our evaluation. | ● |
The group selectively deployed post-compromise instruments based on its targets and the goal’s surroundings. Machine A belonged to a challenge coordinator and Machine B to an IT worker. The info out there to us means that MirrorFace stole private information from Machine A and sought deeper community entry on Machine B, aligning the assumed targets with the workers’ roles.
Day 0 – August 27th, 2024
MirrorFace operators despatched an e-mail with a malicious hyperlink on August 26th, 2024 to the institute’s CEO. Nonetheless, because the CEO didn’t have entry to a machine operating Home windows, the CEO forwarded the e-mail to 2 different workers. Each opened the dangerous LNK file, The EXPO Exhibition in Japan in 2025.docx.lnk, the following day, compromising two institute machines and resulting in the deployment of ANEL. Thus, we take into account August 27th, 2024, as Day 0 of the compromise. No further exercise was noticed past this foothold institution.
Day 1 – August 28th, 2024
The following day, MirrorFace returned and continued with its actions. The group deployed a number of instruments for entry, management, and file supply on each compromised machines. Among the many instruments deployed had been PuTTY, VS Code, and HiddenFace – MirrorFace’s present flagship backdoor. On Machine A, MirrorFace additionally tried to deploy the device Hidden Begin. On Machine B, the actor moreover deployed csvde and the personalized variant of AsyncRAT.
Day 2 – August 29th, 2024
On Day 2, MirrorFace was lively on each machines. This included deploying extra instruments. On Machine A, MirrorFace deployed a second occasion of HiddenFace. On Machine B, VS Code’s distant tunnel, HiddenFace, and AsyncRAT had been executed. Moreover these, MirrorFace additionally deployed and executed frp and Rubeus by way of HiddenFace. That is the final day on which we noticed any MirrorFace exercise on Machine B.
Day 3 – August 30th, 2024
MirrorFace remained lively solely on Machine A. The institute, having began assault mitigation measures on August 29th, 2024, may need prevented additional MirrorFace exercise on Machine B. On Machine A, the group deployed AsyncRAT and tried to keep up persistence by registering a scheduled activity.
Day 6 – September 2nd, 2024
Over the weekend, i.e., on August 31st and September 1st, 2024, Machine A was inactive. On Monday, September 2nd, 2024, Machine A was booted and with it MirrorFace’s exercise resumed as nicely. The principle occasion of Day 6 was that the group exported Google Chrome’s internet information equivalent to contact info, key phrases, autofill information, and saved bank card info right into a SQLite database file. We had been unable to find out how MirrorFace exported the info, and whether or not or how the info was exfiltrated.
Conclusion
In 2024, MirrorFace refreshed its TTPs and tooling. It began utilizing ANEL – believed to have been deserted round 2018/2019 – as its first-line backdoor. Mixed with different info, we conclude that MirrorFace is a subgroup beneath the APT10 umbrella. Moreover ANEL, MirrorFace has additionally began utilizing different instruments equivalent to a closely personalized AsyncRAT, Home windows Sandbox, and VS Code distant tunnels.
As part of Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace focused a Central European diplomatic institute – to the perfect of our information, that is the primary time the group has attacked an entity in Europe – utilizing the identical refreshed TTPs seen throughout its 2024 campaigns. Throughout this assault, the risk actor used the upcoming World Expo 2025 – to be held in Osaka, Japan – as a lure. This reveals that even contemplating this new broader geographic concentrating on, MirrorFace stays targeted on Japan and occasions associated to it.
Our shut collaboration with the affected group supplied a uncommon, in-depth view of post-compromise actions that will have in any other case gone unseen. Nonetheless, there are nonetheless quite a lot of lacking items of the puzzle to attract a whole image of the actions. One of many causes is MirrorFace’s improved operational safety, which has develop into extra thorough and hinders incident investigations by deleting the delivered instruments and information, clearing Home windows occasion logs, and operating malware in Home windows Sandbox.
For any inquiries about our analysis printed on WeLiveSecurity, please contact us at threatintel@eset.com.ESET Analysis presents non-public APT intelligence stories and information feeds. For any inquiries about this service, go to the ESET Menace Intelligence web page.
IoCs
A complete record of indicators of compromise (IoCs) and samples will be present in our GitHub repository.
Information
| SHA-1 | Filename | Detection | Description |
| 018944FC47EE2329B23B |
3b3cabc5 | Win32/MirrorFace.A | AES-encrypted ANEL. |
| 68B72DA59467B1BB477D |
vsodscpl.dll | Win32/MirrorFace.A | ANELLDR. |
| 02D32978543B9DD1303E |
AtokLib.dll | Win32/MirrorFace.A | ANELLDR. |
| 2FB3B8099499FEE03EA7 |
CodeStartUser.bat | Win32/MirrorFace.A | Malicious batch file. |
| 9B2B9A49F52B37927E6A |
erBkVRZT.bat | Win32/MirrorFace.A | Malicious batch file. |
| AB65C08DA16A45565DBA |
useractivitybroker.xml | Win32/ FaceXInjector.A | FaceXInjector. |
| 875DC27963F8679E7D8B |
temp.log | Win32/MirrorFace.A | Malicious CAB file. |
| 694B1DD3187E876C5743 |
tmp.docx | Win32/MirrorFace.A | Decoy Phrase |
| F5BA545D4A1683675698 |
normal_.dotm | Win32/MirrorFace.A | Phrase template with |
| 233029813051D20B61D0 |
The EXPO |
Win32/MirrorFace.A | Malicious LNK file. |
| 8361F7DBF81093928DA5 |
The EXPO |
Win32/MirrorFace.A | Malicious ZIP archive. |
| 1AFDCE38AF37B9452FB4 |
NK9C4PH_.zip | Win32/MirrorFace.A | Malicious ZIP archive. |
| E3DA9467D0C89A9312EA |
N/A | MSIL/Riskware.Rubeus.A | Rubeus device. |
| D2C25AF9EE6E60A341B0 |
Tk4AJbXk.wsb | Win32/MirrorFace.A | Malicious Home windows |
Community
| IP | Area | Internet hosting supplier | First seen | Particulars |
| N/A | vu4fleh3yd4ehpfpc |
N/A | 2024‑08‑28 | MirrorFace’s AsyncRAT C&C server. |
| N/A | u4mrhg3y6jyfw2dmm |
N/A | 2024‑08‑28 | MirrorFace’s AsyncRAT C&C server. |
| 45.32.116[.]146 | N/A | The Fixed Firm, LLC | 2024‑08‑27 | ANEL C&C server. |
| 64.176.56[.]26 | N/A | The Fixed Firm, LLC | N/A | Distant server for FRP consumer. |
| 104.233.167[.]135 | N/A | PEG-TKY1 | 2024‑08‑27 | HiddenFace C&C server. |
| 152.42.202[.]137 | N/A | DigitalOcean, LLC | 2024‑08‑27 | HiddenFace C&C server. |
| 208.85.18[.]4 | N/A | The Fixed Firm, LLC | 2024‑08‑27 | ANEL C&C server. |
MITRE ATT&CK methods
This desk was constructed utilizing model 16 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
| Tactic | ID | Title | Description |
| Useful resource Growth | T1587.001 | Develop Capabilities: Malware | MirrorFace has developed customized instruments equivalent to HiddenFace. |
| T1585.002 | Set up Accounts: Electronic mail Accounts | MirrorFace created a Gmail account and used it to ship a spearphishing e-mail. | |
| T1585.003 | Set up Accounts: Cloud Accounts | MirrorFace created a OneDrive account to host malicious information. | |
| T1588.001 | Get hold of Capabilities: Malware | MirrorFace utilized and customised a publicly out there RAT, AsyncRAT, for its operations. | |
| T1588.002 | Get hold of Capabilities: Device | MirrorFace utilized Hidden Begin in its operations. | |
| Preliminary Entry | T1566.002 | Phishing: Spearphishing Hyperlink | MirrorFace despatched a spearphishing e-mail with a malicious OneDrive hyperlink. |
| Execution | T1053.005 | Scheduled Activity/Job: Scheduled Activity | MirrorFace used scheduled duties to execute HiddenFace and AsyncRAT. |
| T1059.001 | Command-Line Interface: PowerShell | MirrorFace used PowerShell instructions to run Visible Studio Code’s distant tunnels. | |
| T1059.003 | Command-Line Interface: Home windows Command Shell | MirrorFace used the Home windows command shell to make sure persistence for HiddenFace. | |
| T1204.001 | Consumer Execution: Malicious Hyperlink | MirrorFace relied on the goal to obtain a malicious file from a shared OneDrive hyperlink. | |
| T1204.002 | Consumer Execution: Malicious File | MirrorFace relied on the goal to run a malicious LNK file that deploys ANEL. | |
| T1047 | Home windows Administration Instrumentation | MirrorFace used WMI as an execution proxy to run ANEL. | |
| Persistence | T1547.001 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | ANEL makes use of one of many startup directories for persistence. |
| T1574.001 | Hijack Execution Stream: DLL Search Order Hijacking | MirrorFace side-loads ANEL by dropping a malicious library and a professional executable (e.g., ScnCfg32.Exe) | |
| Protection Evasion | T1027.004 | Obfuscated Information or Data: Compile After Supply | FaceXInjector is compiled on each scheduled activity run. |
| T1027.007 | Obfuscated Information or Data: Dynamic API Decision | HiddenFace dynamically resolves the required APIs upon its startup. | |
| T1027.011 | Obfuscated Information or Data: Fileless Storage | HiddenFace is saved in a registry key on the compromised machine. | |
| T1055 | Course of Injection | FaceXInjector is used to inject HiddenFace right into a professional Home windows utility. | |
| T1070.004 | Indicator Removing: File Deletion | As soon as HiddenFace is moved to the registry, the file by which it was delivered is deleted. | |
| T1070.006 | Indicator Removing: Timestomp | HiddenFace can timestomp information in chosen directories. | |
| T1112 | Modify Registry | FaceXInjector creates a registry key into which it shops HiddenFace. | |
| T1127.001 | Trusted Developer Utilities: MSBuild | MSBuild is abused to execute FaceXInjector. | |
| T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Information or Data | HiddenFace reads exterior modules from an AES-encrypted file. | |
| T1622 | Debugger Evasion | HiddenFace checks whether or not it’s being debugged. | |
| T1564.001 | Disguise Artifacts: Hidden Information and Directories | MirrorFace hid directories with AsyncRAT. | |
| T1564.003 | Disguise Artifacts: Hidden Window | MirrorFace tried to make use of the device Hidden Begin, which might disguise home windows. | |
| T1564.006 | Disguise Artifacts: Run Digital Occasion | MirrorFace used Home windows Sandbox to run AsyncRAT. | |
| T1070.001 | Indicator Removing: Clear Home windows Occasion Logs | MirrorFace cleared Home windows occasion logs to destroy proof of its actions. | |
| T1036.007 | Masquerading: Double File Extension | MirrorFace used a so-called double file extension, .docx.lnk, to deceive its goal. | |
| T1218 | Signed Binary Proxy Execution | MirrorFace used wlrmdr.exe as an execution proxy to run ANEL. | |
| T1221 | Template Injection | MirrorFace used Phrase template injection to run malicious VBA code. | |
| Discovery | T1012 | Question Registry | HiddenFace queries the registry for machine-specific info such because the machine ID. |
| T1033 | System Proprietor/Consumer Discovery | HiddenFace determines the presently logged in person’s identify and sends it to the C&C server. | |
| T1057 | Course of Discovery | HiddenFace checks presently operating processes. | |
| T1082 | System Data Discovery | HiddenFace gathers varied system info and sends it to the C&C server. | |
| T1124 | System Time Discovery | HiddenFace determines the system time and sends it to the C&C server. | |
| T1087.002 | Account Discovery: Area Account | MirrorFace used the device csvde to export information from Energetic Listing Area Providers. | |
| Assortment | T1115 | Clipboard Information | HiddenFace collects clipboard information and sends it to the C&C server. |
| T1113 | Display screen Seize | ANEL can take a screenshot and ship it to the C&C server. | |
| Command and Management | T1001.001 | Information Obfuscation: Junk Information | HiddenFace provides junk information to the messages despatched to the C&C server. |
| T1568.002 | Dynamic Decision: Area Technology Algorithms | HiddenFace makes use of a DGA to generate C&C server domains. | |
| T1573 | Encrypted Channel | HiddenFace communicates with its C&C server over an encrypted channel. | |
| T1071.001 | Customary Software Layer Protocol: Net Protocols | ANEL makes use of HTTP to speak with its C&C server. | |
| T1132.001 | Information Encoding: Customary Encoding | ANEL makes use of base64 to encode information despatched to the C&C server. | |
| Exfiltration | T1030 | Information Switch Dimension Limits | HiddenFace can, upon operator request, cut up information and ship it in chunks to the C&C server. |
| T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | HiddenFace exfiltrates requested information to the C&C server. |
