From LinkedIn to X, GitHub to Instagram, there are many alternatives to share work-related data. However posting may additionally get your organization into bother.
01 Dec 2025
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5 min. learn
Worker advocacy has been round as an idea for over a decade. However what began out as a well-intentioned option to improve company profile, thought management and advertising, additionally has some unintended penalties. When professionals publish about their work, their firm and their function, they’re hoping to achieve likeminded professionals, in addition to prospects and companions. However risk actors are additionally paying consideration.
As soon as that data is within the public area, it’s typically used to assist construct convincing spearphishing or enterprise e-mail compromise (BEC)-style assaults. The extra data, the extra alternative for nefarious exercise that might find yourself hitting your group laborious.
The place are your workers sharing?
The primary platforms for sharing such data are the same old suspects. LinkedIn is probably the obvious. It may feasibly be described as the biggest open database of company data on the planet: a veritable treasure trove of job titles, roles, duties and inner relationships. It’s additionally the place recruiters publish job listings, which can overshare technical particulars that may be leveraged afterward in spearphishing assaults.
GitHub is probably higher recognized in a cybersecurity context as a spot the place absent-minded builders publish hardcoded secrets and techniques, IP and buyer particulars. However they may additionally share extra innocuous details about mission names, CI/CD pipeline names and data on what tech stacks and open supply libraries they’re utilizing. They could additionally share company e-mail addresses in Git commit configurations.
Then there are the traditional consumer-facing social platforms like Instagram and X. That is the place workers are more likely to share particulars on their journey plans to conferences, and different occasions which might be weaponized towards them and their group. Even data in your firm web site might be helpful to a would-be fraudster or hacker. Suppose: particulars on technical platforms, distributors and companions, or main company bulletins resembling M&A exercise. It may all present a pretext for classy phishing.
RELATED READING: Is your LinkedIn profile revealing an excessive amount of?
Weaponizing data
The primary stage of a typical social engineering assault is intelligence gathering. The subsequent is weaponizing that intelligence in a spearphishing assault designed to trick the recipient into unwittingly putting in malware to their gadget. Or probably to sharing their company credentials for preliminary entry. This might be achieved through an e-mail, textual content or perhaps a cellphone name. Alternatively, they may use data to impersonate a C-level government or provider in an e-mail, cellphone or video name requesting an pressing wire switch.
These efforts often require a mix of impersonation, urgency and relevance. Listed below are some hypothetical examples:
- An adversary finds LinkedIn data on a brand new starter in an IT function at firm A, together with their core function and duties. They impersonate a key tech vendor claiming that an pressing safety replace is required, referencing the goal’s title, contact particulars and function. The replace hyperlink is malicious.
- A risk actor finds data on two colleagues in GitHub, together with the mission they’re engaged on. They impersonate one in an e-mail asking the opposite to evaluate an hooked up doc, which is booby-trapped with malware.
- A fraudster finds a video of an government on LinkedIn, or a company web site. They see on that focus on’s Instagram/X feed that they’re going to be presenting at a convention and can be away from the workplace. Figuring out that the exec could also be laborious to contact, they launch a deepfake BEC assault utilizing video or audio, to trick a finance staff member to wire some pressing funds to a brand new vendor.
Cautionary tales
The above are solely hypotheticals. However loads of actual examples exist of risk actors utilizing “open supply intelligence” (OSINT) strategies within the early phases of assaults. They embrace:
- A BEC assault which price Kids’s Healthcare of Atlanta (CHOA) $3.6m: Menace actors doubtless scoured press releases a couple of newly-announced campus, to search out out extra particulars together with the hospital’s development companion. They’d then have used LinkedIn and/or the company web site to establish key executives and finance staff members of the development agency concerned (JE Dunn). Lastly, they impersonated the CFO in an e-mail to the CHOA finance staff requesting they replace their cost particulars for JE Dunn.
- Russia-based SEABORGIUM and Iran-aligned TA453 teams use OSINT for reconnaissance forward of spearphishing assaults on pre-selected targets. Based on the UK NCSC, they use social media {and professional} networking platforms to “analysis their [targets’] pursuits and establish their real-world social or skilled contacts.” As soon as belief and rapport have been established over e-mail, they ship a hyperlink to reap victims’ credentials.
Cease the share? The way to mitigate spearphishing danger
The dangers of oversharing are actual, however happily the treatments are simple. Essentially the most potent weapon in your armory is training. Replace safety consciousness applications to make sure that all workers, from executives down, perceive the significance of not oversharing on social media. In some instances, it will require a cautious rebalancing of priorities, away from worker advocacy in any respect prices. Warn workers to keep away from sharing through unsolicited DMs, even when they acknowledge the person (as their account could have been hijacked). And guarantee they will spot phishing, BEC and deepfake makes an attempt.
Again this up with a strict coverage on social media use, defining purple strains on what can and might’t be shared, and making use of clear boundaries between private {and professional}/official accounts. Company web sites and accounts may additionally have to be reviewed and up to date to take away any data that might be weaponized.
Multi-factor authentication (MFA) and robust passwords (saved in a password supervisor) must also be a given throughout all social media accounts, in case skilled accounts are hijacked to focus on colleagues.
Lastly, monitor publicly accessible accounts the place attainable for any data that might be leveraged for spearphishing and BEC. And run purple staff workouts towards workers to check their consciousness.
Sadly, AI is making it sooner and simpler than ever for risk actors to profile targets, acquire OSINT after which craft convincing emails/messages in excellent pure language. AI-powered deepfakes enhance their choices but additional. The underside line ought to be, if it’s within the public area, anticipate a cybercriminal additionally is aware of about it … and can come knocking quickly.
