DragonForce isn’t just one other ransomware model – it’s a destabilizing pressure attempting to reshape the ransomware panorama. Counter Menace Unit (CTU) researchers are actively monitoring the evolution of the risk posed by the group.
Enter the dragon
DragonForce is concerned in high-impact assaults focusing on each conventional IT infrastructure and virtualized environments (e.g., VMware ESXi), with a powerful emphasis on credential theft, Lively Listing abuse, and knowledge exfiltration. In March 2025, it launched efforts to assert dominance within the ransomware ecosystem by introducing a extra versatile affiliate mannequin and focusing on different ransomware teams.
A collection of assaults on UK retailers that started in late April introduced this group into sharper focus as third-party stories linked these assaults to DragonForce and the GOLD HARVEST (also called Scattered Spider) risk group. GOLD HARVEST often leverages social engineering, abuse of distant monitoring and administration (RMM) instruments, and multi-factor authentication (MFA) bypass strategies to realize entry, steal bulk knowledge, and typically deploy ransomware.
When DragonForce emerged in August 2023, it provided a standard RaaS scheme. On March 19, 2025, the group introduced a rebrand as a ‘cartel’ to broaden its attain, hoping to emulate the success of LockBit and different mature ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) teams. In follow, it isn’t a cartel operation however an providing that provides associates the pliability to leverage DragonForce’s infrastructure and ransomware instruments whereas working underneath their very own manufacturers (see Determine 1).
Determine 1: Commercial for the DragonForce cartel
DragonForce didn’t simply revamp its enterprise mannequin; it started attacking rival operations. The ‘cartel’ submit coincided with defacements of leak websites operated by the BlackLock and Mamona ransomware teams. The defacements appeared to have been carried out by DragonForce, as seen within the side-by-side display captures in Determine 2.
Determine 2: Defaced Mamona (left) and BlackLock (proper) leak websites
In April, a submit on the RansomHub leak website appeared to advertise the DragonForce cartel, as seen in Determine 3. A DragonForce submit on the RAMP underground discussion board additionally appeared to point that the teams have been working collectively, however the postscript instructed that RansomHub may not help the collaboration (see Determine 4). RansomHub is among the most prolific teams to emerge following the LockBit disruption and ALPHV (also called BlackCat) demise in 2024.
Determine 3: DragonForce cartel point out on RansomHub leak website
Determine 4: DragonForce submit suggesting a collaboration with RansomHub
Shortly after these posts, the RansomHub leak website went offline. The homepage displayed the message “RansomHub R.I.P 03/03/2025.” The “collaboration” between DragonForce and RansomHub seems to have been extra of a hostile takeover by DragonForce. The ‘koley’ persona, who is understood to be a outstanding RansomHub member, posted a defacement of the DragonForce homepage on RAMP (see Determine 5), together with the message “@dragonforce guess you could have traitors…” Extra posts by koley accused DragonForce of working with legislation enforcement, attacking rivals, and telling lies.
Determine 5: Defacement of the DragonForce leak website shared by RansomHub member ‘koley’
As of this publication, the DragonForce leak website is again on-line after an prolonged interval of down time. Throughout that interval, the homepage displayed a message stating that it could be up once more quickly, and an identical message seems on the RansomBay leak website (see Determine 6).
Determine 6: DragonForce and RansomBay leak website homepages as of Could 2, 2025
In Could 2025, UK retailer Marks and Spencer was the topic of a major cyberattack that was publicly attributed to GOLD HARVEST (referred to within the reporting as Scattered Spider), though this attribution has not been formally confirmed. This group is a loosely organized cybercriminal collective made up of particular person risk actors who collaborate via a shared community of underground boards and encrypted chat channels utilized by a neighborhood of like-minded people often known as “The Com.” The risk actors on this neighborhood coordinate malicious companies to conduct assaults, change instruments, and share ways inside this decentralized ecosystem. GOLD HARVEST reportedly deployed the DragonForce ransomware on this assault.
GOLD HARVEST has been recognized to function as a ransomware affiliate, deploying ALPHV ransomware in assaults on MGM Resorts in 2023 and reportedly utilizing RansomHub in assaults all through 2024. The risk actors make the most of a variety of ways, strategies, and procedures (TTPs) of their assaults however are recognized for his or her efficient use of social engineering. They usually achieve entry to organizations by focusing on IT assist desks. Public attribution of the Marks and Spencer assault could also be predicated on the idea that the assault began with social engineering, maybe focusing on assist desk workers.
Social engineering is a common risk throughout the cyber panorama and isn’t distinctive to GOLD HARVEST, though the group has been adept at utilizing this method through e-mail and phone calls. There’s growing interaction between social engineering and stolen credentials. GOLD HARVEST is recognized to make use of commodity infostealers akin to Vidar and Raccoon, which acquire browser-saved passwords, cookies, and session tokens. These credentials can allow preliminary entry straight or help extra convincing social engineering makes an attempt by permitting attackers to reference inner programs or mimic respectable worker habits.
DragonForce has claimed two assaults impacting UK retailers. These assaults spotlight the necessity for vigilance by firms within the retail sector. The inner warfare amongst ransomware teams is disruptive to their very own operations however doesn’t scale back threat to organizations. In actual fact, it could result in extra erratic, opportunistic assaults as teams scramble to say dominance and monetize stolen knowledge in new methods. Organizations should due to this fact revisit their incident response, risk intelligence, and third-party threat administration methods to stay resilient in an more and more chaotic risk setting.
Suggestions for defenders
Whereas technical controls stay important for detecting and mitigating GOLD HARVEST and DragonForce exercise, they should be strengthened by sturdy inner processes and constant human vigilance. These assaults reinforce that technical compromises usually start with social compromise. Conversations are often the preliminary level of compromise, not exploits. Organizations should scale back their publicity to social engineering by combining technical controls with procedural self-discipline. CTU researchers suggest that organizations take the next actions to mitigate the dangers of those assaults:
- Deploy browser isolation and password managers to stop harvesting of saved credentials.
- Implement endpoint detection for infostealer exercise, together with credential and session cookie theft.
- Make the most of an identification monitoring answer that makes use of darkish net sources and risk intel feeds to repeatedly monitor for compromised credentials.
- Implement strict identification verification protocols for IT help and assist desk interactions.
- Set up clear escalation paths to empower front-line workers to withstand uncommon or pressing requests till they are often verified.
- Conduct common tabletop workouts that simulate social engineering and insider risk eventualities.
