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ScarCruft compromises gaming platform in a supply-chain assault

Admin by Admin
May 6, 2026
Home Cybersecurity
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ESET researchers uncovered a multiplatform supply-chain assault by North Korea-aligned APT group ScarCruft, focusing on the Yanbian area in China – residence to ethnic Koreans and a crossing level for North Korean refugees and defectors. Within the assault, in all probability ongoing since late 2024, ScarCruft compromised Home windows and Android elements of a online game platform devoted to Yanbian-themed video games, trojanizing them with a backdoor.

The backdoor, named BirdCall by ESET, was initially identified to focus on Home windows solely; the Android model was found as a part of this supply-chain assault. On this blogpost, we offer an outline of the assault, and the primary public evaluation of the Android backdoor.

Key factors of this blogpost:

  • North Korea-aligned APT group ScarCruft compromised a online game platform utilized by ethnic Koreans dwelling within the Yanbian area in China.
  • The gaming platform’s Home windows shopper was compromised by means of a malicious replace resulting in the RokRAT backdoor, which deployed the extra subtle BirdCall backdoor.
  • Android video games obtainable on the gaming platform have been trojanized to include the Android model of the BirdCall backdoor – a brand new device in ScarCruft’s arsenal.
  • The aim of the marketing campaign is espionage, with the backdoor able to accumulating private knowledge and paperwork, taking screenshots, and making voice recordings.

Scarcruft profile

ScarCruft, also referred to as APT37 or Reaper, has been working since at the very least 2012 and is suspected to be a North Korean espionage group. It primarily focuses on South Korea, however different Asian international locations have additionally been focused. ScarCruft appears to be primarily in authorities and army organizations, and corporations in varied industries linked to the pursuits of North Korea. The group additionally targets North Korean defectors, with the most recent such exercise introduced on this blogpost.

BirdCall backdoor

Home windows model

BirdCall is a Home windows backdoor written in C++ that we found in 2021 and attributed to ScarCruft as a part of the ESET Menace Intelligence reporting.

The backdoor has a variety of spying capabilities, together with taking screenshots, logging keystrokes and clipboard content material, stealing credentials and recordsdata, and executing shell instructions. For C&C functions, the backdoor makes use of official cloud storage companies, comparable to Dropbox or pCloud, or compromised web sites. BirdCall is normally deployed in a multistage loading chain, beginning with a Ruby or Python script, and containing elements encrypted utilizing a computer-specific key. The preliminary model of BirdCall was publicly described by South Korean distributors in 2021 as a sophisticated model of RokRAT (S2W, AhnLab).

Android model

The Android model of BirdCall, found within the assault that we describe on this blogpost, implements a subset of the instructions and capabilities of the Home windows backdoor – it collects contacts, SMS messages, name logs, paperwork, media recordsdata, and personal keys. It might probably additionally take screenshots and file surrounding audio.

Based mostly on our analysis, Android BirdCall was actively developed over a span of a number of months. We recognized seven variations, starting from model 1.0 (created roughly in October 2024) to model 2.0 (created roughly in June 2025).

Discovery

Our investigation began with a suspicious APK file discovered on VirusTotal. Upon preliminary evaluation, we decided that the APK is malicious and accommodates a backdoor.

Curiously, the APK turned out to be a trojanized card recreation referred to as 延边红十 (machine translation: Yanbian Purple Ten), which we traced to its official web site, https://www.sqgame[.]web. sqgame is a gaming platform tailor-made for the folks of Yanbian and hosts conventional Yanbian video games for Home windows, Android, and iOS. The gamers can compete in card and board video games (see Determine 1) with mates or be part of organized tournaments.

Figure 1. Yanbian Red Ten game
Determine 1. Yanbian Purple Ten recreation

Surprisingly, the APK obtainable for obtain on the official web site is identical because the APK we initially discovered on VirusTotal. Furthermore, a second Android recreation (新画图, machine translation: New Drawing) obtainable for obtain from sqgame was additionally trojanized with the identical backdoor. Additional evaluation revealed that the backdoor is an Android port of the ScarCruft group’s BirdCall backdoor.

The Home windows desktop shopper hyperlink on the sqgame web site results in a few-years-old installer that seems to be clear. It does obtain updates as soon as put in, however we didn’t establish any malicious code there throughout our evaluation.

Investigating additional in ESET telemetry, we recognized a trojanized mono.dll library, originating from an replace package deal for the desktop shopper. ESET telemetry reveals that this replace package deal had been malicious since at the very least November 2024, for an unknown interval. On the time of writing, this replace package deal was now not malicious.

We additionally checked the iOS recreation obtainable on the sqgame web site and didn’t discover any malicious code. We predict that ScarCruft skipped this platform, for the reason that trojanization and supply of the app could be way more troublesome in comparison with different platforms, presumably operating into Apple’s evaluate course of.

Victimology

For the reason that web site compromised on this assault is devoted to the folks of Yanbian and their conventional video games, we infer that the first targets are ethnic Koreans dwelling in Yanbian. Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture is a area in China that borders North Korea and is residence to the most important ethnic Korean neighborhood outdoors Korea.

On this context, we imagine that it’s possible that the assault was geared toward accumulating info on people based mostly in (or originating from) the Yanbian area and deemed of curiosity to the North Korean regime – most certainly refugees or defectors.

Assault overview

Android

Two of the Android video games obtainable on the sqgame web site have been discovered to be trojanized to include the BirdCall backdoor. The obtain web page obtainable at https://www.sqgame[.]web/video games/gamedownload.aspx is proven in Determine 2, with obtain buttons for the 2 trojanized video games highlighted in crimson. The third obtainable Android recreation was clear on the time of our evaluation.

Figure 2. Download page leading to trojanized games
Determine 2. Obtain web page resulting in trojanized video games

We discovered proof that the victims downloaded the trojanized video games by way of an internet browser on their gadgets and doubtless put in them deliberately. We’ve got not discovered another APK areas. We additionally haven’t discovered the malicious APKs on the official Google Play retailer.

We have been unable to find out when the web site was first compromised and the supply-chain assault began. Nonetheless, based mostly on our evaluation of the deployed malware, we estimate that it occurred in late 2024.

Desk 1 reveals the internet hosting URLs of the 2 trojanized APK recordsdata, together with the hashes of recordsdata served on the time of discovery. On the time of writing of this blogpost, the malicious recordsdata have been nonetheless up on the sqgame web site. We notified sqgame of the compromise in December 2025, however haven’t acquired a response.

Desk 1. Malicious samples

Time of discovery URL SHA‑1 Description
2025-10 http://sqgame.com[.]cn/ybht.apk 03E3ECE9F48CF4104AAFC535790CA2FB3C6B26CF Trojanized recreation with the BirdCall backdoor.
2025-10 http://sqgame.com[.]cn/sqybhs.apk FC0C691DB7E2D2BD3B0B4C1E24D18DF72168B7D9 Trojanized recreation with the BirdCall backdoor.

Home windows

Whereas the Home windows desktop shopper obtainable on the sqgame web site didn’t include malicious code once we analyzed it, we later recognized a trojanized mono.dll library, originating from an replace package deal of the desktop shopper hosted on the URL http://xiazai.sqgame.com[.]cn/courting/20240429.zip. ESET telemetry reveals that this replace package deal had been malicious since at the very least November 2024, for an unknown interval – however on the time of writing, this replace package deal was now not malicious.

ScarCruft took a clear mono library and patched it with additional code and knowledge, containing a downloader. The downloader first checks operating processes for evaluation instruments and digital machine environments and doesn’t proceed if any are discovered. In any other case, it appears for the method of the sqgame shopper and constructs a path to the mono library in its set up folder.

Subsequent, it downloads and executes shellcode, which contained the RokRAT backdoor on the time of discovery. Lastly, the downloader terminates the shopper course of and downloads the unique clear model of the mono library, changing the trojanized one within the put in shopper folder. Each the payload and clear mono library are downloaded from official South Korean web sites that have been compromised for this objective – a typical TTP of ScarCruft.

In keeping with our telemetry, the RokRAT backdoor was subsequently used to obtain and set up the BirdCall backdoor on the victimized machines.

Android BirdCall evaluation

On this part, we offer a technical evaluation of the Android BirdCall backdoor – an Android port of the eponymous Home windows backdoor written in C++. Internally, the backdoor is called zhuagou, which may be translated (from Chinese language) as “catching canines”.

Trojanized Android video games

Android BirdCall is distributed by way of trojanized Android video games. Within the assault described on this blogpost, we imagine that ScarCruft didn’t achieve entry to the sport’s supply code, solely to the sqgame web site or net server, and as a substitute took the unique recreation APKs and recompiled or repackaged them with malicious code added.

Within the trojanized APKs, the AndroidManifest.xml entry level exercise is modified and factors to the added malicious code – which, after beginning the backdoor, executes the unique entry exercise of the sport.

Within the analyzed samples, the modified entry level exercise was both com.instance.zhuagou.SplashScreen or com.mob.util.MobSs (within the newest pattern). The modifications to AndroidManifest.xml additionally embrace new exercise and repair definitions for the backdoor, in addition to further permissions required for its operation. A comparability of packages within the authentic recreation and its trojanized model is proven in Determine 3.

Figure 3. Package tree of the legitimate game (left) and its trojanized version (right)
Determine 3. Bundle tree of the official recreation (left) and its trojanized model (proper)

For the reason that Android BirdCall backdoor is part of a trojanized Android app put in on the system, it doesn’t robotically begin after set up or a tool reboot; as a substitute, it depends on consumer execution.

Configuration

Android BirdCall accommodates a default configuration, which is initialized on the primary run. The configuration makes use of JSON format and is continued in a file. Subsequent runs load the present configuration file, and the configuration may be modified by way of backdoor instructions. An instance of a formatted configuration is proven in Determine 4.

{
    "bi": "E823D451D636D0A0",
    "skey": "A8FE823D451D636D0A0366C0629EF5C3##@(()(#@",
    "si": "20251105141404",
    "rft": 20000,
    "fst": true,
    "kill": false,
    "log": true,
    "ctm": 10000,
    "scr": false,
    "rec": false,
    "cmd": 0,
    "knowledge": 1,
    "bd_version": 37,
    "extentions": ".jpg;.doc;.docx;.xls;.xlsx;.ppt;.pptx;.txt;.hwp;.pdf;.m4a;.p12;",
    "cloud": [
        {
            "ct": 9,
            "idx": 28,
            "cid": "1000.2IGB56IS1FHQ1V332R[redacted]",
            "cst": "fa7ec5c8b050[redacted]",
            "rt": "1000.a7fc479e[redacted]",
            "at": "empty",
            "fid": "8mwe5bbc0a2759839401f813968808a2f36a6",
            "dm": "",
            "use": 0
        },
        [redacted]
    ]
}

Determine 4. Android BirdCall configuration instance

The bd_version configuration entry encodes the model of the backdoor, saved as MAJOR << 5 | MINOR, so worth 37 is the same as model 1.5.

The continued configuration file is saved within the knowledge listing of the app and has a device-specific path. Moreover, throughout the configuration initialization, the default configuration of cloud storage drives hardcoded within the pattern may be overridden by an exterior supply. If obtainable, the backdoor downloads a JPG picture that accommodates an encrypted cloud configuration embedded in its overlay. The picture is normally hosted on a compromised South Korean web site.

C&C communication

Android BirdCall makes use of cloud storage drives for C&C communication, just like the Home windows model. Within the analyzed samples, three cloud suppliers are supported: pCloud, Yandex Disk, and Zoho WorkDrive, though solely Zoho WorkDrive is used. The backdoor communicates by way of HTTPS, sending requests to API endpoints of the respective supplier utilizing the okhttp3 library.

Throughout our analysis, we noticed 12 Zoho WorkDrive drives utilized by the Android BirdCall backdoor for C&C functions. Particulars of the related accounts are proven in Desk 2.

Desk 2. Android BirdCall Zoho WorkDrive accounts

client_id display_name e-mail
1000.AJUEYDUIQQ5GCLFA68[redacted] tomasalfred37 tomasalfred37@zohomail[.]com
1000.INXKBHQ3698CK42YA2[redacted] kalimaxim279 kalimaxim279@zohomail[.]com
1000.FYRJ46E75TUYBWYV5J[redacted] Smith Bentley smithbentley0617@zohomail[.]com
1000.8QU6D2LJZ3RCGLZWF2[redacted] Mic haelLarrow19 michaellarrow19@zohomail[.]com
1000.NT1QEE7V73IHNZP5YT[redacted] dsf sdf amandakurth94@zohomail[.]com
1000.SKXUYYKYL06FQ2NW82[redacted] dsf sdf rexmedina89@zohomail[.]com
1000.7BMBOS8GV1ZR6AWEI2[redacted] dsf dsf alishaross751@zohomail[.]com
1000.V0J0QN7SJ2N7V6IZVE[redacted] sdf sdf jamesdeeds385@zohomail[.]com
1000.2IGB56IS1FHQ1V332R[redacted] asdf sdaf joyceluke505@zohomail[.]com
1000.W4V2XMB83C6VFC7DGZ[redacted] dfsd sdf marjoriemiller280@zohomail[.]com
1000.LIUBF67S89H0IZEBHE[redacted] Invoice Jackson teresadaniels200@zohomail[.]com
1000.8BLOFSFU4WOFY9HB4A[redacted] Zoe Jack michaelgiesen62@zohomail[.]com

Capabilities

Android BirdCall options an replace mechanism: a more moderen model may be loaded from an replace file, which is anticipated to be within the type of an APK within the app knowledge listing, and its obtain is triggered by way of the command MP_SEND_FILE.

After the elective replace process, the unique recreation exercise is began, so as to not elevate suspicion. Then the backdoor checks and waits for an web connection, earlier than continuing to its principal operation.

Knowledge assortment

On the primary run, the backdoor collects a full listing itemizing of the system’s major shared exterior storage, and consumer knowledge consisting of contact listing, name log, and SMS messages.

The backdoor periodically checks in with the C&C and uploads fundamental info, which consists of:

  • identifier values from configuration and present time,
  • battery temperature, RAM and storage info, cloud configuration, backdoor model, and file extensions of curiosity,
  • IP geolocation info from https://ipinfo[.]io/json, and
  • on the primary run, further details about the system, community, and the applying is included:

    ○ model, mannequin, OS, kernel, and rooted standing,

    ○ IMEI quantity, IP tackle, MAC tackle, and community kind, and

    ○ utility package deal and permissions.

The backdoor can periodically take screenshots (scr flag). In some variations, we noticed the strategy of taking part in a silent MP3 file in a loop whereas taking screenshots, which is used to forestall the trojanized app from being suspended whereas operating within the background.

In a few of the variations, the backdoor can file audio by way of the microphone and snoop on the environment of the compromised system. Surprisingly, even when the recording is enabled (rec flag), it’s restricted to a three-hour time interval within the night, from 7 pm to 10 pm native time.

The backdoor periodically searches the shared exterior storage for recordsdata with extensions of curiosity (extentions) and phases them for exfiltration. Within the samples we analyzed, exfiltration was geared toward media recordsdata, paperwork, and personal keys: .jpg, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .ppt, .pptx, .txt, .hwp, .pdf, .m4a, and .p12.

Instructions

Android BirdCall periodically checks the cloud storage drive for instructions issued for the sufferer. Decrypted instructions begin with the magic DWORD 0x2A7B4C33, and this worth matches the Home windows model of BirdCall. The instructions have zero or extra parameters, relying on their kind. Desk 3 reveals an outline of the supported instructions with their descriptions for each platforms.

The Android model of the backdoor implements solely a subset of instructions obtainable within the Home windows model.

Desk 3. BirdCall backdoor instructions

Kind Title Android description Home windows description
0x48 MP_SET_FILESEARCH_EXTENTION Units file extensions of curiosity within the configuration.
0x49 MP_SET_THREADS Toggles screenshot taking and voice recording. Contains further capabilities comparable to clipboard stealing and keylogging.
0x4A MP_SET_CLOUD Units cloud API credentials within the configuration.
0x4B MP_SET_REGISTER_FILE_CONTROL N/A Modifies filter used throughout file search.
0x4C MP_SET_MODE Toggles assortment of the backdoor execution logs. Toggles varied collection-related flags.
0x4D MP_ACTION_KILLME Disables the backdoor. The unique recreation continues working. Uninstalls the backdoor and exits.
0x4E MP_ACTION_KILLPROCESS N/A Makes use of the taskkill utility to kill a course of.
0x4F MP_ACTION_FILE_OR_DIRECTORY Helps add of a specified file or listing. Helps a number of file and listing operations: delete, rename, open, and add.
0x50 MP_ACTION_DOWNLOAD_COMMAND N/A Downloads and executes instructions from a URL or cloud drive.
0x51 MP_ACTION_RESET_WORKDIRECTORIES N/A Can delete working directories utilized by the backdoor.
0x52 MP_ACTION_EXECUTE_SIMPLE_COMMAND N/A Can restart the backdoor and execute a command by way of cmd.exe.
0x53 MP_ACTIONS_MORE N/A Can carry out three operations:
· Delete continued configuration.
· Allow macros in Phrase (Microsoft and Hancom Workplace).
· Restart the backdoor.
0x54 MP_ACTION_SHELL N/A Begins shell (based mostly on WCMD).
0x55 MP_ACTION_WEBSCAN N/A Performs HTTP scan of specified hosts/ports.
0x56 MP_GET_DATA Can receive:
· contacts, name logs, and SMS messages,
· full listing itemizing of the first shared exterior storage, and
· fundamental info.
Can receive:
· backdoor configuration and varied system info,
· credentials from browsers and different software program,
· recordsdata from IM apps – KakaoTalk, WeChat, and Sign,
· digital camera pictures, and
· listing itemizing.
0x57 MP_GET_TREES Retrieves listing itemizing.
0x59 MP_SEND_FILE Helps backdoor updating. Helps dropping of a file to a specified location, dropping and execution of further executables, and updating of the backdoor.
0x5A MP_SEND_SHELL N/A Executes shell instructions.
0x5C MP_SET_PROXY N/A Connects to a specified : and forwards visitors from/to the C&C server, performing as a proxy.

A dump containing the Home windows model of BirdCall that carefully resembles the one we noticed on this assault and options all of the instructions listed above may be discovered on VirusTotal with SHA‑1 B06110E0FEB7592872E380B7E3B8F77D80DD1108. The pattern was uploaded from China on July 15th, 2024.

Conclusion

We’ve got uncovered a multiplatform supply-chain assault focusing on the Yanbian area by means of a compromised online game platform. Analyzing the trojanized Android video games on the platform, we found a brand new device in ScarCruft’s arsenal – an Android model of the group’s BirdCall backdoor. The Android backdoor has seen lively improvement, and gives surveillance capabilities, comparable to assortment of private knowledge and paperwork, taking screenshots, and making voice recordings.

For any inquiries about our analysis revealed on WeLiveSecurity, please contact us at threatintel@eset.com. 
ESET Analysis provides personal APT intelligence studies and knowledge feeds. For any inquiries about this service, go to the ESET Menace Intelligence web page.

IoCs

A complete listing of indicators of compromise (IoCs) and samples may be present in our GitHub repository.

Information

SHA-1 Filename Detection Description
01A33066FBC6253304C92760916329ABD50C3191 sqybhs.apk Android/Spy.Agent.EXM Trojanized recreation with Android BirdCall model 2.0.
03E3ECE9F48CF4104AAFC535790CA2FB3C6B26CF ybht.apk Android/Spy.Agent.EGE Trojanized recreation with Android BirdCall model 1.3.
2B81F78EC4C3F8D6CF8F677D141C5D13C35333AF sqybhs.apk Android/Spy.Agent.EGE Trojanized recreation with Android BirdCall model 1.5.
59A9B9D47AE36411B277544F25AD2CC955D8DD2C ybht.apk Android/Spy.Agent.EGE Trojanized recreation with Android BirdCall model 1.0.
7356D7868C81499FB4E720F7C9530E5763B4C1D0 sqybhs.apk Android/Spy.Agent.EGE Trojanized recreation with Android BirdCall model 1.0.
FC0C691DB7E2D2BD3B0B4C1E24D18DF72168B7D9 sqybhs.apk Android/Spy.Agent.EGE Trojanized recreation with Android BirdCall model 1.5.
95BDB94F6767A3CCE6D92363BBF5BC84B786BDB0 mono.dll Win32/TrojanDownloader.Agent.ILQ Trojanized mono library.
409C5ACAED587F62F7E23DA47F72C4D9EC3144D9 N/A Win32/TrojanDownloader.Agent.ILQ Downloader resulting in the RokRAT backdoor.
B06110E0FEB7592872E380B7E3B8F77D80DD1108 N/A Win64/Agent.EGN Publicly obtainable dump of Home windows BirdCall backdoor.

Community

IP Area Internet hosting supplier First seen Particulars
39.106.249[.]68 sqgame.com[.]cn Hangzhou Alibaba Promoting Co.,Ltd. 2024‑06‑01 Compromised sqgame web site internet hosting trojanized video games and malicious updates.
211.239.117[.]117 1980food.co[.]kr Hostway IDC 2025‑03‑07 Compromised South Korean web site used to host Android BirdCall configuration.
114.108.128[.]157 inodea[.]com LG DACOM Company 2025‑07‑03 Compromised South Korean web site used to host Android BirdCall configuration.
221.143.43[.]214 www.lawwell.co[.]kr SK Broadband Co Ltd 2024‑11‑04 Compromised South Korean web site used to host shellcode and clear mono library.
222.231.2[.]20 colorncopy.co[.]kr
swr.co[.]kr
LG DACOM Company 2025‑03‑18 Compromised South Korean web site used to host shellcode.
222.231.2[.]23 sejonghaeun[.]com IP Supervisor 2025‑03‑18 Compromised South Korean web site used to host clear mono library.
222.231.2[.]41 cndsoft.co[.]kr IP Supervisor 2025‑03‑18 Compromised South Korean web site used to host shellcode.

MITRE ATT&CK strategies

This desk was constructed utilizing model 18 of the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise framework.

Tactic ID Title Description
Useful resource Growth T1584.004 Compromise Infrastructure: Server ScarCruft compromised South Korean web sites to host payloads and configurations.
ScarCruft compromised the sqgame web site to carry out a supply-chain assault.
T1585.003 Set up Accounts: Cloud Accounts ScarCruft created Zoho WorkDrive accounts and used their cloud storage drives for C&C functions.
T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware ScarCruft developed the Android model of the BirdCall backdoor.
T1608.001 Stage Capabilities: Add Malware ScarCruft uploaded trojanized video games to the compromised sqgame web site.
Preliminary Entry T1195.002 Provide Chain Compromise: Compromise Software program Provide Chain ScarCruft compromised an sqgame replace server to distribute malicious updates.
Execution T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Home windows Command Shell BirdCall can execute shell instructions.
Protection Evasion T1027.013 Obfuscated Information or Data: Encrypted/Encoded File BirdCall has encrypted strings and loading chain elements.
The trojanized mono library accommodates encrypted shellcode.
T1070.004 Indicator Elimination: File Deletion The trojanized mono library is changed with a clear one.
T1112 Modify Registry BirdCall can modify settings of phrase processors to allow macros.
T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Information or Data BirdCall decrypts strings and loading chain elements.
T1480.001 Execution Guardrails: Environmental Keying BirdCall’s loading chain has elements encrypted with a computer-specific key.
T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion The downloader within the trojanized mono library checks for evaluation instruments and digital machine environments.
Credential Entry T1555 Credentials from Password Shops BirdCall can receive saved passwords from browsers and different software program.
Discovery T1046 Community Service Discovery BirdCall can scan a spread of IPs and ports with an HTTP GET request.
T1082 System Data Discovery BirdCall can receive varied system info.
T1083 File and Listing Discovery BirdCall can receive details about drives and directories.
Assortment T1005 Knowledge from Native System BirdCall can acquire consumer recordsdata from IM shoppers KakaoTalk, WeChat, and Sign.
T1056.001 Enter Seize: Keylogging BirdCall can log keystrokes.
T1113 Display screen Seize BirdCall can seize screenshots.
T1115 Clipboard Knowledge BirdCall can acquire clipboard contents.
T1119 Automated Assortment BirdCall can periodically acquire recordsdata with sure extensions from native and detachable drives.
T1125 Video Seize BirdCall can seize a webcam picture.
T1560 Archive Collected Knowledge BirdCall compresses and encrypts collected knowledge earlier than exfiltration.
Command and Management T1071.001 Software Layer Protocol: Internet Protocols BirdCall makes use of HTTP to speak with cloud storage companies.
T1090 Proxy BirdCall can act as a proxy.
T1102.002 Internet Service: Bidirectional Communication BirdCall communicates with cloud storage companies to obtain instructions and exfiltrate knowledge.
Exfiltration T1020 Automated Exfiltration BirdCall periodically exfiltrates collected knowledge.
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel BirdCall exfiltrates knowledge to its C&C server.
T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Internet Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage BirdCall exfiltrates knowledge to cloud storage companies.

This desk was constructed utilizing model 18 of the MITRE ATT&CK Cell framework.

Tactic ID Title Description
Preliminary Entry T1474.003 Provide Chain Compromise: Compromise Software program Provide Chain ScarCruft carried out a supply-chain assault, compromising the sqgame web site, to distribute trojanized video games containing the Android BirdCall backdoor.
Protection Evasion T1406 Obfuscated Information or Data Model 2.0 of the Android BirdCall backdoor is obfuscated.
T1407 Obtain New Code at Runtime The Android BirdCall backdoor can obtain and cargo newer variations of itself.
T1541 Foreground Persistence Android BirdCall makes use of the startForeground API to take screenshots whereas within the background.
Discovery T1420 File and Listing Discovery Android BirdCall creates a listing itemizing and searches for recordsdata with specified extensions.
T1422 Native Community Configuration Discovery Android BirdCall obtains the system’s IMEI, IP tackle, and MAC tackle.
T1426 System Data Discovery Android BirdCall obtains system info of the compromised system together with model, mannequin, OS model, kernel model, rooted standing, battery temperature, RAM, and storage info.
Assortment T1532 Archive Collected Knowledge Android BirdCall compresses and encrypts collected knowledge.
T1429 Audio Seize Android BirdCall can file voice utilizing the microphone.
T1430 Location Monitoring Android BirdCall obtains approximate system location utilizing the ipinfo[.]io service.
T1513 Display screen Seize Android BirdCall can take screenshots.
T1533 Knowledge from Native System Android BirdCall collects native recordsdata with the next extensions: .jpg, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .ppt, .pptx, .txt, .hwp, .pdf, .m4a, and .p12.
T1636.002 Protected Person Knowledge: Name Log Android BirdCall collects the decision log.
T1636.003 Protected Person Knowledge: Contact Listing Android BirdCall collects the contact listing.
T1636.004 Protected Person Knowledge: SMS Messages Android BirdCall collects SMS messages.
Command and Management T1437.001 Software Layer Protocol: Internet Protocols Android BirdCall communicates with the C&C cloud storage drive utilizing HTTPS.
T1481.002 Internet Service: Bidirectional Communication Android BirdCall makes use of a Zoho WorkDrive service cloud storage drive for C&C functions.
Exfiltration T1646 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Android BirdCall makes use of the C&C channel for knowledge exfiltration.

Tags: AttackCompromisesGamingPlatformScarCruftsupplychain
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